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NOT LOSING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES:   
DISTINGUISHING CONSERVATION TRANSFER 
FEES FROM OTHER PRIVATE TRANSFER FEES 
Frank C. Aiello∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Private transfer fee covenants against real property are increasingly under fire 
from Congress,1 federal regulators,2 and state legislatures.3  This fire has been 
fueled by strong advocacy from the National Association of Realtors.4  It will only 
be a matter of time before private transfer fees will also be challenged in state 
courts as not meeting the common law requirements for a servitude.  As these 
bodies take aim at the private transfer fee, they literally must not lose sight of the 
forest for the trees.  A private transfer fee that benefits conservation and 
environmental stewardship is consistent with the traditional use of a servitude and 
can provide a valuable benefit to property owners and the public. 
This article argues that private transfer fees, when used to fund conservation 
and environmental stewardship, meet the historical and modern requirements for a 
valid servitude, that courts should hold them enforceable, and that policymakers 
should exempt them from general private transfer fee restrictions. 
II.  DEFINING PRIVATE TRANSFER FEES, DEVELOPER TRANSFER FEES, AND 
CONSERVATION TRANSFER FEES 
A private transfer fee covenant requires payment of a fee to a third party upon 
sale of the property subject to the covenant.5  The fee is usually payable by the 
seller and calculated as a percentage of the purchase price.6  The function is similar 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ Frank C. Aiello is an Associate Professor at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School, where he 
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 1. See, e.g., H.R. 6260, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010); H.R. 6332, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010). 
 2. See, e.g., Private Transfer Fees, 76 Fed. Reg. 6702 (proposed Feb. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1228). 
 3. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
 4. Field Guide to Private Transfer Fees, NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, http://www.realtor.org/ 
library/library/fg350 (last visited October 11, 2011). 
 5. Private Transfer Fees, 76 Fed. Reg. at 6703. 
 6. Id. 
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to a real property transfer tax but with the proceeds instead going to a private party.  
This article will focus primarily on two different types of private transfer fees, 
referred to here as “developer transfer fees” and “conservation transfer fees.” 
Real estate developers have embraced private transfer fees as a way to create a 
long term revenue stream from a real estate development or to finance a 
development by securitizing such an income stream.7  As used in this article, a 
“developer transfer fee” shall describe the typical scenario when a developer 
includes a private transfer fee in a declaration associated with a new development.8   
The declaration includes a private transfer fee covenant intended to bind 
subsequent owners for 99 years.9  After the initial sale, the covenant requires that 
the initial buyer and any future seller pay a small percentage of the purchase price 
to a party designated by the developer.10  The failure to pay the fee will result in a 
lien against the property to satisfy the private transfer fee obligation.11  The 
developer may retain the right to receive the fee over time or may sell the right.12 
Many charitable organizations have also embraced private transfer fees as a 
way to fund their work.  Of particular interest to this article are private transfer fees 
that benefit land trusts.13  This article will use the term “conservation transfer fee” 
to refer to a private transfer fee covenant that requires payment of the fee to a land 
trust. 
A land trust is defined as “a nonprofit organization that, as all or part of its 
mission, actively works to conserve land by undertaking or assisting in land or 
conservation easement acquisition, or by its stewardship of such land or 
easements.”14  The federal government has recognized the unique and important 
role of land trusts by providing a generous tax deduction for land trust donors.15  
Land trusts have conserved thirty-seven million acres of land in the United States, 
an area roughly equal to all of New England.16  A conservation transfer fee may be 
connected to a land trust’s holding of a conservation easement against the property.    
A conservation easement is a unique easement, enforceable in perpetuity, where the 
owner transfers his right to develop the property to a land trust.17 
The proceeds of a conservation transfer fee may be utilized by a land trust for 
different purposes, depending on the terms of the covenant.18  Typically, the 
proceeds are utilized for environmental stewardship of the land subject to the 
covenant, environmental stewardship of land in the land trust’s service area, 
                                                                                                     
 7. Id. 
 8. See R. Wilson Freyermuth, Putting the Brakes on Private Transfer Fee Covenants, PROB. & 
PROP., July/Aug. 2010, at 20, 21. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Private Transfer Fees, 76 Fed. Reg. at 6703; see also Freyermuth, supra note 8, at 21. 
 11. Freyermuth, supra note 8, at 21. 
 12. Id. 
 13. The term land trust and land conservancy are generally interchangeable. 
 14. Types of Land Trusts, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-
trusts/types-of-land-trusts (last visited October 11, 2011). 
 15. 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2006). 
 16. Land Trusts, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trusts (last visited 
October 11, 2011). 
 17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.6 cmt. a (2000). 
 18. Id. § 1.6(1). 
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acquisition of other natural lands, or administrative expenses incurred by the land 
trust upon transfer of the property to a new owner.  
III.  A CONSERVATION TRANSFER FEE IS AN ENFORCEABLE SERVITUDE 
In those instances where a private transfer fee is not explicitly prohibited by 
statute or regulation, it must still survive the traditional requirements of a 
servitude19 under real property law.  And to the extent policymakers continue to 
evaluate the value of private transfer fees, their characterization under real property 
law may be instructive.  This article argues that a developer transfer fee falls short 
of the requirements necessary to be an enforceable servitude, but a conservation 
transfer fee does not. 
In order for any promise to bind a party simply as a result of its ownership of 
land (as distinct from being a party to the original agreement), the promise must 
meet the requirements of an enforceable servitude under real property law.  
According to the Restatement, “[s]ervitudes may be used whenever an arrangement 
that does not require renegotiation on transfer of the land is desired.”20  Servitudes 
will then “run with the land” and bind subsequent owners.21  Like most real 
property concepts, the requirements for a servitude to run with the land are 
modernizing at glacial speed.  This article will walk through both the traditional 
and modern legal tests that exist at this time for a servitude to “run with the land,” 
paying particular attention to those requirements that bear on the issue of a private 
transfer fee’s enforceability. 
A.  A Conservation Transfer Fee Meets the Common Law Requirements of a Real 
Covenant 
For a servitude to bind the subsequent owners of land who were not party to 
the original agreement, the servitude must satisfy the elements of a real covenant 
under the common law.  The common law doctrine providing for the enforceability 
of a real covenant against a successor in interest to the original covenanting party is 
a complicated and often misinterpreted mess.  The Author is hesitant to wade into 
these waters at all.  Nonetheless, there are a few common truths that bear on the 
question at hand. 
 Without getting distracted by too much nuance, a fair survey of the 
requirements for a covenant to “run with the land” include that it (i) be enforceable 
between the original covenanting parties,22 (ii) in a majority of jurisdictions, meet 
the statute of frauds,23 (iii) be intended by the parties to run to successors in 
interest, 24 (iv) enjoy vertical privity between both the benefited and burdened party 
                                                                                                     
 19. Unless specifically addressing the common law requirements of a real covenant or equitable 
servitude or their modernized conception as a simple “servitude” under the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROPERTY: SERVITUDES, this article will refer to all of these concepts inclusively as servitudes. 
 20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES ch. 1, intro. note. 
 21. Id. 
 22. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.14, at 473 (3d ed. 
2000). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. § 8.16, at 481. 
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back to the original parties to the covenant,25 (v) have horizontal privity for the 
burden to run,26 and (vi) touch and concern the land.27  The equitable servitude, a 
cousin to the real covenant that was born in the courts of equity, has similar 
requirements.28  But an equitable servitude does not require horizontal privity 
amongst the original covenanting parties.29    
A private transfer fee can easily meet the requirements of a real covenant or an 
equitable servitude with one critical exception, which is whether a private transfer 
fee touches and concerns the land.  A developer transfer fee rarely will meet the 
touch and concern requirement, whereas a conservation transfer fee clearly does 
meet the requirement.30 
The “touch and concern” requirement has been characterized as “a concept, 
and like all concepts has space and content that can be explored and felt better than 
it can be defined.”31  Generally, a covenant touches and concerns the land if the 
promise affects the use, enjoyment, or value of the property.32  Covenants that 
require doing a physical thing to land or to refrain from doing a physical thing 
usually are found to touch and concern the land.33  Promises to pay a sum of money 
are more suspect of meeting the touch and concern requirement,34 although 
covenants for the payment of money for improvements to the land have been found 
to touch and concern the land.35  Annual assessment fees have been upheld when 
the proceeds are utilized in a way that will benefit the encumbered property.36 
Whether a private transfer fee meets the touch and concern requirement has 
not yet been tested in the courts.  Just as in the cases that have upheld an ongoing 
association fee,37 the ultimate use of the private transfer fee proceeds will be 
critical.  If the private transfer fee proceeds are utilized in a way that “touches and 
concerns” the land, the private transfer fee will be enforceable as a real covenant. 
Some argue, for good reason, that developer transfer fees do not meet the 
touch and concern requirement.38  The proponents of developer transfer fees 
                                                                                                     
 25. Id. § 8.17, at 482. 
 26. Id. § 8.18, at 486. 
 27. Id. § 8.15, at 475. 
 28. Id. § 8.23, at 493. 
 29. Id. § 8.26, at 498-502. 
 30. The Federal Housing Financing Administration characterized it as an “open question” whether a 
private transfer fee that funds conservation efforts, but is not restricted to use for the encumbered 
property, meets the “touch and concern” element.  See Private Transfer Fees, 76 Fed. Reg. 6702, 6706 
(proposed Feb. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1228). 
 31. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 22, at 475. 
 32. See HERBERT T. TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 854, at 455 (3d ed. 
2009). 
 33. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 22, at 475. 
 34. Id. at 476. 
 35. See, e.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 797 
(N.Y. 1938) (finding that a covenant touched and concerned a particular tract of land where the 
covenant included an annual fee for maintenance of surrounding properties accessible to the owner of 
the tract by an easement included in the conveyance of the tract). 
 36. Id. at 794, 798. 
 37. See, e.g., id. 
 38. See generally Marjorie Ramseyer Bardwell & James Geoffrey Durham, Transfer Fee Rights: Is 
the Lure of Sharing in Future Appreciation a Flawed Concept?, PROB. & PROP., May/June 2007; 
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counter that they benefit the encumbered property owner by decreasing the price 
paid for the property.39  Another argument in favor of developer transfer fees is that 
they provide a financing vehicle, without which the project would not have been 
possible.  Even so, these reasons do not rise to the unique requirement of touching 
and concerning the land.  Association and similar fees, traditionally collected 
annually, do touch and concern the land as they provide for the maintenance of 
common elements and infrastructure of benefit to the property encumbered by the 
fee.  The fee may go to the maintenance of the development’s common road and 
thus benefits the property by providing for this well-maintained ingress.  A similar 
argument cannot be made for a developer transfer fee.  The proceeds of a developer 
transfer fee will go to the developer or his assignee without reinvestment into the 
development or subject property.  This private benefit does not touch and concern 
the encumbered property.40 
In contrast, a conservation transfer fee that restricts use of the fee’s proceeds to 
the stewardship of the subject land clearly meets the touch and concern 
requirement.  For example, a real covenant that requires payment of a fee for the 
maintenance of a subdivision wastewater system would easily pass muster under 
traditional real covenant requirements.41  Similarly, a conservation transfer fee, 
amongst other uses, may provide for the maintenance of a natural area providing 
for freshwater recharge of the properties’ watershed.  The preservation of this 
environmental infrastructure directly benefits the subject property in the same way 
that man-made infrastructure does.  Or perhaps the funds from the conservation 
transfer fee are utilized to remove an invasive plant species from the subject 
property that would otherwise result in the destruction of a forested area.  This 
protection of the property’s natural resources should be considered to touch and 
concern the land because it benefits the land. Still early in their response to private 
transfer fees, policymakers have found great importance in whether the proceeds of 
a conservation transfer fee are used exclusively on the subject property or if they 
are used elsewhere.42  While this is an understandable initial reaction given the 
context of servitude doctrine, the emphasis on this distinction is misplaced.  A 
conservation transfer fee meets the touch and concern requirement even if the fee is 
not restricted to use on the subject property.  In some cases, a conservation transfer 
                                                                                                     
Freyermuth, supra note 8; R. Wilson Freyermuth, Private Transfer Fee Covenants: Cleaning up the 
Mess, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 419 (2010). 
 39. Process Overview, FREEHOLD CAPITAL PARTNERS, http://freeholdcapitalpartners.com/ 
overview.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). 
 40. See Private Transfer Fees, 76 Fed. Reg. 6702, 6703 (proposed Feb. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1228). (“In response to questions at congressional hearings, FHFA expressed concerns that 
private transfer fees may be used to fund purely private continuous streams of income for select market 
participants either directly or through securitized investment vehicles, and may not benefit homeowners 
or the properties involved.”). 
 41. The Restatement has explicitly acknowledged the appropriateness of a similar covenant.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, § 3.7 illus. 7 (2000) (noting that a developer-imposed 
servitude requiring that subsequent purchasers exclusively obtain water and sewer services from a 
municipal water utility in exchange for installation of services would not be an unconscionable tying 
arrangement). 
 42. See Private Transfer Fees, 76 Fed. Reg. at 6706 (the FHFA declined to endorse private transfer 
fees that finance activities that do not provide a “direct benefit” to the encumbered property but rather 
benefit the general community). 
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fee’s proceeds may be restricted to use by a land trust (not including general 
operations), acquisition of other natural land, or environmental stewardship of other 
land in the land trust’s service area.  Even if the fee proceeds are not directly 
utilized for the benefit of the property subject to a conservation transfer fee, the 
proceeds will likely fund environmental protection efforts in an environmentally 
connected area.  Environmental threats outside the boundaries of the property may 
represent a threat to the quality of the land inside the property’s borders.  Courts 
must recognize that environmental protection outside of the property’s borders has 
the potential to directly benefit the subject property.  A failure to acknowledge the 
value that this environmental protection adds to the property is a rejection of the 
advances made in understanding environmental science since the doctrines of real 
covenants originated. 
A conservation transfer fee also meets the touch and concern requirement 
because, unlike a developer transfer fee, the beneficiary of a conservation transfer 
fee itself is likely holding an interest in the property subject to the fee.  Remember 
that a conservation transfer fee may be connected to a land trust’s holding of a 
conservation easement against the subject property.  This conservation easement, a 
unique easement in gross, is providing the land trust with an actual interest in the 
property subject to the conservation transfer fee covenant.  The courts’ usual 
wariness in providing a personal benefit like a developer transfer fee to a party not 
holding an interest in the subject property or adjacent land is unfounded against a 
land trust benefited by a conservation transfer fee. 
B.  A Conservation Transfer Fee Meets the Requirements of a Servitude under the 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes 
As mentioned previously, the law of property modernizes at glacial speed.  
The Restatement (Third) of Property’s attempt to synthesize and modernize the law 
of servitudes is not yet widely adopted.  Thus an examination of how conservation 
transfer fees might be evaluated under the Restatement is instructive on how the 
Restatement suggests we treat these interests but may not be reflective of most 
states’ doctrine at this time. 
The Restatement suggests a shift away from the formalistic requirements of an 
enforceable real covenant to an approach focused on the intent of the parties and 
the historical policy concerns of real property law.43  Toward this end, the 
Restatement has abandoned the distinction between real covenants and equitable 
servitudes as irrelevant under modern law, grouping both interests under the 
general category of servitudes.44  A private transfer fee’s enforceability will be 
judged as a servitude under the Restatement as it is a “legal device that creates a 
right or an obligation that runs with the land or an interest in land.”45 
                                                                                                     
 43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES ch. 2, intro. note. 
 44. See id. ch. 1, intro. note (“Continuing use of the dual terminology of real covenant and equitable 
servitude is confusing because it suggests the continued existence of two separate servitude categories 
with important differences.  In fact, however in modern law there are no significant differences.  Valid 
covenants, like other contracts and property interests, can be enforced and protected by both legal and 
equitable remedies as appropriate, without regard to the form of the transaction that created the 
servitude.”). 
 45. Id. § 1.1. 
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The requirements for an enforceable servitude under the Restatement are 
different than those for a real covenant or equitable servitude under traditional real 
property doctrine to the extent that the Restatement has abandoned the touch and 
concern requirement.46  The Restatement instead finds that a servitude is valid 
unless it is illegal, unconstitutional, or violates public policy.47  A servitude is also 
invalid if it lacks rational justification.48  Amongst other criteria, a servitude 
violates public policy if it imposes an unreasonable restraint on alienation49 or is 
unconscionable.50 
A private transfer fee is not invalid as a direct restraint on alienation.51  “A 
servitude that imposes a direct restraint on alienation of the burdened estate is 
invalid if the restraint is unreasonable.  Reasonableness is determined by weighing 
the utility of the restraint against the injurious consequences of enforcing the 
restraint.”52  An analysis of reasonableness is not required, however, because the 
Restatement clearly identifies a private transfer fee as an indirect, rather than a 
direct, restraint on alienation.53 
A developer transfer fee is invalid as an unconscionable, indirect restraint on 
alienation.  As an indirect restraint on alienation, a private transfer fee will be 
enforceable “even if it indirectly restrains alienation by limiting the use that can be 
made of property, by reducing the amount realizable by the owner on sale or other 
transfer of the property, or by otherwise reducing the value of the property.”54  But 
a servitude is invalid if it is “unconscionable.”55  The illustrations accompanying 
the Restatement explicitly identify a developer transfer fee as unconscionable.56 
While a developer transfer fee is invalid as an unconscionable indirect restraint 
on alienation, a conservation transfer fee is valid.  The Restatement illustrations 
specify only a developer transfer fee as unconscionable and do not extend this 
commentary to any other type of private transfer fee.57  As the illustrations do not 
                                                                                                     
 46. Id. § 3.2. 
 47. Id. § 3.1. 
 48. Id. § 3.5(2). 
 49. Id. §§ 3.1(3). 
 50. Id. §§ 3.1(5), 3.7. 
 51. Id. § 3.4. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See id. § 3.4 illus. 2 (“O, the owner of Blackacre, conveyed it to A.  The deed provided that in 
the event A transferred Blackacre to another, A would pay O $10,000.  The deed provision is an indirect 
restraint on alienation, subject to the rule stated in § 3.5.”). 
 54. Id. § 3.5(1). 
 55. Id. § 3.7. 
 56. See, e.g., id. § 3.7 illus.3 (providing that “[t]he declaration of covenants for Green Acres, a 
residential subdivision, includes a provision obligating the owner of each lot to pay the developer, or its 
assigns, a royalty of one percent of the gross sales price on each resale of each lot in the subdivision in 
perpetuity.  In the absence of unusual circumstances, the conclusion would be justified that the provision 
is unconscionable.  If not unconscionable, the covenant would be subject to termination under the rule 
stated in § 7.12.”).  Additionally, the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts “is of the 
view that transfer fee covenants payable to a developer serve no useful purpose in land development and 
thus create an unreasonable restraint on the alienability of land.”  Joint Editorial Bd. for Unif. Real Prop. 
Acts, Position Paper on Transfer Fee Covenants (April 2010) [hereinafter JEBURPA Position Paper], 
available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/18844/2074_Joint_Editorial_Board_for_Uniform_Real_Prop 
_ Acts_and_Attach.pdf (attached to an October 12, 2010 letter written by JEBURPA). 
 57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, § 3.7 cmts. c-d, illus. 1-8. 
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directly condemn a conservation transfer fee, it is valid if it meets the other 
requirements of an indirect restraint: that it has rational justification58 and is not 
unconscionable.59 
The Restatement does not identify specific examples of servitudes that lack 
rationality, but given the Restatement’s strong embrace of conservation 
easements,60 it is difficult to imagine a conservation transfer fee failing the low 
hurdle of rationality. 
Other than a developer transfer fee, the Restatement also identifies the 
following examples of unconscionable servitudes: a prohibition against bringing 
legal action against a developer,61 an indemnification of a developer,62 and a 
requirement to utilize a certain real estate broker or pay a penalty.63  A common 
thread amongst these illustrations, including a developer transfer fee, is the lack of 
reciprocal benefit to the property encumbered by the servitude.  In contrast, and as 
explained in the context of real covenants above, a conservation transfer fee 
provides great benefit to the property subject to the fee.  As a conservation transfer 
fee will provide such a reciprocal benefit, it is not unconscionable. 
Even if a court found that a conservation transfer fee was analogous to a 
developer transfer fee and thus unconscionable under the Restatement’s 
characterization, it is important to note that the Restatement anticipates 
circumstances where even a developer transfer fee is not unconscionable if there 
are “unusual circumstances.”64  Certainly the unique nature of conservation and 
environmental stewardship, undertaken by a charitable organization, should qualify 
as an unusual circumstance removing unconscionability. 
The Restatement indirectly endorses fees for conservation purposes, and 
perhaps conservation transfer fees, as valid servitudes.  Section 7.12 of the 
Restatement provides for modification and termination of certain servitudes to pay 
money or provide services if the servitude does not specify the total sum due or 
termination point65 or if the obligation becomes excessive in relation to the cost or 
value received by the burdened estate.66  Tellingly, the Restatement provides that 
the ability to modify or terminate these covenants does not apply to an obligation 
imposed by a conservation servitude.67  The Restatement anticipated a fee funding 
conservation in this provision and made it explicit that such a fee should not be 
terminable or modifiable.68  It is a fair assumption that the drafters intended a fee 
benefiting conservation to be a valid servitude.  It is hard to see a reason that a 
conservation transfer fee would be distinguishable from any other fee benefiting 
                                                                                                     
 58. See id. § 3.5(2). 
 59. See id. § 3.7. 
 60. See, e.g., id. §§ 1.6 cmt. b (discussing the public’s interest in conservation easements); 7.11 cmt. 
a (noting the importance of conservation easements will increase with population growth); 8.5  cmt. a 
(noting the “strong public interest” in conservation easements). 
 61. Id. § 3.7 cmt. c, illus. 1. 
 62. Id. § 3.7 cmt. c, illus. 2. 
 63. Id. § 3.7 cmt. d, illus. 6. 
 64. Id. § 3.7 cmt. c, illus. 3. 
 65. Id. § 7.12(1). 
 66. Id. § 7.12(2). 
 67. Id. § 7.12(3). 
 68. Id. 
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conservation under the Restatement. 
In further support of distinguishing a conservation transfer fee from a 
developer transfer fee, note that the Restatement recognizes the unique nature of 
conservation in multiple other contexts.  The Restatement recognizes that (i) the 
social value of limiting the development of land outweighs the social harm caused 
by removing the property from commerce,69 (ii) a conservation servitude is 
uniquely perpetual in contrast to other servitudes,70 (iii) a conservation servitude 
will generally only be transferable to a governmental body or conservation 
organization,71 (iv) modification of a conservation servitude by a court should be 
consistent with the cy pres doctrine72 and not subject to the Restatement’s rules 
regarding changed conditions,73 and (v) a conservation servitude is not terminable 
under a marketable-title act.74 
IV.  LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY BODIES SHOULD NOT RESTRICT 
CONSERVATION TRANSFER FEES WHEN RESTRICTING THE USE OF OTHER PRIVATE 
TRANSFER FEES 
A.  A Conservation Transfer Fee does not have the Negative Impact of a Developer 
Transfer Fee 
Commentators are critical of private transfer fees beyond their enforceability 
as valid servitudes, arguing that they should be prohibited by legislative or 
regulatory action.75  As discussed below, many states have already restricted the 
use of private transfer fees.76  Federal legislation has also been introduced that 
would prohibit Freddie Mac and Fanny Mae from dealing with properties restricted 
by private transfer fees,77 and the Federal Housing Finance Agency has proposed a 
regulation that would also restrict Freddie Mac and Fanny Mae from dealing in 
such properties.78  It is important that these legislative and regulatory initiatives do 
not confuse developer transfer fees with public-benefiting transfer fees such as 
conservation transfer fees.  This section identifies the policy arguments against 
developer transfer fees that were not already addressed in the servitude discussion 
above and explains how these arguments do not apply to conservation transfer fees. 
                                                                                                     
 69. Id. § 3.1 cmt. i, illus. 19. 
 70. Id. § 4.3(3)-(4). 
 71. Id. § 4.6(b) (“The benefit of a conservation servitude held by a governmental body or 
conservation organization . . . is transferable only to another governmental body or conservation 
organization unless the instrument that created the servitude provides otherwise.”). 
 72. The cy pres doctrine is “the equitable doctrine under which a court reforms a written instrument 
with a gift to charity as closely to the donor’s intention as possible, so that the gift does not fail.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 444 (9th ed. 2009). 
 73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.11. (“Changes in the value of the servient 
estate for development purposes are not changed conditions that permit modification or termination of a 
conservation servitude.”). 
 74. Id. § 7.16(5). 
 75. See, e.g., Freyermuth, supra note 8, at 21. 
 76. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 77. H.R. 6260,  Cong (2d Sess. 2010). 
 78. Private Transfer Fees, 76 Fed. Reg. 6702, 6708 (proposed Feb. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1228). 
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Proponents of private transfer fees, eager to minimize their potential harm, 
argue that a buyer can adjust its offer to purchase a property to account for the 
effect of a private transfer fee.79  Opponents counter that buyers cannot accurately 
price the effect of a private transfer fee covenant over time and may underestimate 
its affect on the sale price of the property.80  Regardless of its merits, this argument 
does not apply to a conservation transfer fee covenant.  Most property subject to a 
conservation transfer fee covenant will already be subject to a conservation 
easement.  The conservation easement, by removing any owner’s ability to develop 
the property, will have greatly reduced the value of the property.  All future buyers 
will purchase the property with notice of this restriction and the purchase price will 
be appropriately adjusted to reflect the restriction.  The potential impact of a 
conservation transfer fee on the reduction in the price obtained by the buyer will be 
nominal once compared to that caused by the conservation easement. 
Opponents of private transfer fees argue that they unreasonably hinder the 
alienability of land by imposing additional transaction costs necessary to identify 
the correct recipient of the fee and to release any lien interest of the payee.81  The 
purchaser of a property subject to a conservation easement will already be on 
notice of a very unique encumbrance on the property and be required to develop a 
relationship with the conservation easement holder as that holder continues to 
steward and enforce the restrictions against the eased property.  The increased 
burden of the property owner becoming aware of a conservation transfer fee 
benefiting the easement holder will be minimal and will come naturally as they 
acquaint themselves with the terms of the conservation easement. 
Opponents of private transfer fees also argue that they result in a reduction to 
the real property tax base.82  In most states, property subject to a conservation 
transfer fee will already have a reduced taxable value because a conservation 
easement restricts the future development of the property.  Society has accepted 
this loss of value in exchange for the public good that results from the restriction.  
The federal government provides a very generous tax deduction to encourage such 
a donation.83  Many states also provide tax deductions and even credits to 
encourage the donation of conserved land.84  To the extent that a conservation 
transfer fee creates a greater reduction in value than otherwise exists because of the 
conservation easement, it is further distinguishable from a developer transfer fee.  
A developer transfer fee benefits only the developer or its assignee.  A conservation 
transfer fee is utilized for the environmental stewardship and protection of the 
property, a function that otherwise reduces the burden of government. 
It is also argued that private transfer fees add undesirable complexity to real 
estate transactions, requiring the discovery and disclosure of fees at the time of 
                                                                                                     
 79. Process Overview, supra note 39. 
 80. See Freyermuth, supra note 8, at 23. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See id. at 23-24. 
 83. See 26 U.S.C. §170 (2006).  See also supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 84. State and Local Tax Incentives, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/ 
policy/tax-matters/campaigns/state-tax-incentives (last visited Oct. 11, 2011). 
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closing.85  A purchaser of property subject to a conservation easement will already 
have notice of this unique encumbrance on its property and the relationship it will 
have with the easement holder.  Discovery of the conservation transfer fee will only 
be a slight additional burden in this context. 
Some have also argued that a private transfer fee robs homeowners of their 
equity by requiring payment of the fee upon the sale of their property.86  This 
argument implies that the seller and property did not receive any value in exchange 
for the fee.  This may in fact be true of a developer transfer fee.  However, a seller 
whose land was subject to a conservation easement has, in contrast, benefited from 
the easement holder’s environmental stewardship of the property. 
B.  States Should Continue to Allow Conservation Transfer Fees by Exempting 
them Completely from Private Transfer Fee Restrictions 
The Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts (“JEBURPA”) has 
proposed model legislation for the restriction of private transfer fees under state 
law.87  While JEBURPA’s position paper in support of the model legislation does 
not discuss the matter at length, the model legislation makes an exception to the 
prohibition on private transfer fees for charitable organizations in certain 
circumstances.88  Nineteen states have adopted a restriction on private transfer 
fees,89 some similar to that proposed by JEBURPA, and nine of those states have 
included some exception for charitable organizations.90 
                                                                                                     
 85. See Private Transfer Fees, 76 Fed. Reg. 6702, 6703 (proposed Feb. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1228). 
 86. Id. 
 87. JEBURPA Position Paper, supra note 56, at 11-12. 
 88. Id. at 12.  The paper also states: 
A transfer fee covenant recorded after the effective date of this section, or any lien to the 
extent that it purports to secure the payment of a transfer fee, is not binding on or 
enforceable against the affected real property or any subsequent owner, purchaser, or 
mortgagee of any interest in the property. 
Id. (quoting proposed model state legislation section 1(c)).  The proposed model legislation further 
provides that 
[t]he term ‘transfer fee covenant’ shall not include: . . . any provision of a document 
requiring payment of a fee or charge to an organization described in Section 501(c)(3) or 
501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue Code, to be used exclusively to support cultural, 
educational, charitable, recreational, environmental, conservation, or other similar 
activities benefiting the real property affected by the provision or the larger community 
of which the property is a part. 
Id. at 11-12 (quoting proposed model state legislation section 1(a)(4)(D)). 
 89. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-442 (2011); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1098.5 (West 2011); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 25, § 319 (2011); FLA. STAT. § 689.28 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 28-501 (2011); 765 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 155/10 (2011); IOWA CODE § 558.49 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3821 (2011); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3133 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-708 (West 2011); MINN. STAT. § 
513.73 (2011); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 89-1-69 (West 2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 442.558 (2011); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 46:30-28 to -30 (West 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A-3 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 5301.057 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 93.269 (2011); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.017 (West 2011); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-46 (West 2011). 
 90. FLA. STAT. § 689.28; HAW. REV. STAT. § 28-501; 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 155/10; MISS. CODE. 
ANN. § 89-1-69; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:30-28 to -30 ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39A-3; OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 5301.057; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.017; UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-46. 
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The model law’s exception allows for a conservation transfer fee when the 
proceeds of the fee are used directly to benefit the property subject to the fee or the 
“larger community of which the property is a part.”91  The model legislation does 
not define what would constitute a “larger community,” and it is unclear whether 
this would allow a conservation transfer fee when the proceeds are utilized for the 
general operations of the land trust.92 
As argued above, when discussing the benefits of environmental conservation, 
the distinction between a direct benefit to a specific piece of property or to a larger 
ecosystem is misplaced.93  States adopting the model legislation should do away 
with this direct benefit requirement in the context of environmental and 
conservation purposes.  Leaving the restriction as-is will also create an 
administrative burden on land trusts, requiring them to carefully account for how 
the proceeds of a conservation transfer fee are actually applied.  This burden may 
discourage a land trust from using an otherwise appropriate and valuable tool for 
conservation and environmental stewardship. 
C.  Any Federal Legislation Restricting Private Transfer Fees Should Exempt 
Conservation Transfer Fees 
Federal legislation was introduced in the 111th Congress to either restrict 
private transfer fees94 or require an additional notice95 of their existence in a 
property’s chain of title.  As a conservation transfer fee is a valid servitude and 
does not share the ill effects of the developer transfer fee, any proposed restriction 
on private transfer fees should include a broad exception for conservation transfer 
fees. 
The proposed Homeowner Equity Protection Act of 201096 would make it 
illegal to collect a private transfer fee in connection with any federally related 
mortgage loan97 or to enforce a lien for securing the payment of such fee.98  Similar 
to JEBURPA’s Model Legislation, the Homeowner Equity Protection Act would 
                                                                                                     
 91. JEBURPA Position Paper, supra note 56, at 12 (quoting proposed model state legislation 
section 1(a)(4)(D)). 
 92. See id. at 11-12. 
 93. See supra, pp. 6-7. 
 94. See Homeowner Equity Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 6260, 111th Cong. § 13 (2d Sess. 2010). 
 95. The proposed Homebuyer Enhanced Fee Disclosure Act creates a “presumption of validity” for 
any private transfer fee where (i) a unique notice is recorded contemporaneous to the recording of the 
document creating the fee, and (ii) the fee is not more than one percent of the gross sales price or 
effective for greater than 99 years.  H.R. 6332, 111th Cong. § 3(c) (2d Sess. 2010).  The Act also 
prohibits any property from being restricted by more than one transfer fee covenant.  Id. § 3(d).  The Act 
does not require this special notice for fees payable to homeowners associations, but any other private 
transfer fee, including a conservation transfer fee, would need to satisfy the bill’s notice requirements to 
be “presumed valid.”  Id. § 4(3). 
 96. H.R. 6260. 
 97. A “federally related mortgage loan” is broadly defined under federal law and includes 
residential real estate mortgages provided by a federally insured financial institution or intended to be 
sold to the Federal National Mortgage Association, the Government National Mortgage Association, the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, or a financial institution from which it is to be purchased by 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.  12 U.S.C. § 2602(1) (2006). 
 98. H.R. 6260 § 13(a). 
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not prohibit private transfer fees that benefit homeowner associations99 or 
charitable organizations that utilize the fee exclusively to support activities 
benefiting the property subject to the fee or the community of which the property is 
a part.100  The term “community” is not defined in the Homeowner Equity 
Protection Act as introduced, nor is it defined in the previously codified Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act,101 which the Homeowner Equity Protection Act 
intended to amend.102  It is thus unclear whether a conservation transfer fee, when 
the proceeds are used for the acquisition of land or stewardship of land not adjacent 
to the subject property, would be prohibited by the proposed act.  If “community” 
is defined narrowly to include the development of which the property is contained, 
the act will prohibit a conservation transfer fee when the proceeds are not restricted 
to direct use on the subject property or the development.  Again, as discussed above 
with respect to JEBURPA’s Model Legislation, the requirement of direct benefit to 
the subject property is not appropriate in the context of conservation or 
environmental stewardship. 
D.  The Federal Housing Financing Agency Should Expand the Exception for 
Conservation Transfer Fees in its Proposed Rule Restricting Private Transfer Fees 
On February 8, 2011, the Federal Housing Finance Agency issued a second 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Request for Comment on a prohibition of the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (commonly referred to as Fannie Mae) and 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (commonly referred to as Freddie 
Mac) from dealing in mortgages or properties encumbered by certain private 
transfer fee covenants.103  Any such prohibition would dramatically curtail the use 
of private transfer fees given Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s role in the mortgage 
finance marketplace.  The original rulemaking proposed a blanket prohibition of 
the agencies dealing in properties encumbered by any private transfer fee.104  This 
total prohibition received a great deal of critical comment.105 
In response to these comments, the latest proposal provides that Fannie and 
Freddie “shall not purchase or invest in any mortgages or properties encumbered by 
private transfer fee covenants, securities backed by such mortgages or securities 
backed by the income stream from such covenants, unless such covenants are 
excepted transfer fee covenants.”106  The revised rule provided for a number of 
exceptions from the prohibition,107 including a conservation transfer fee108 that is 
                                                                                                     
 99. See id. § 13(c)(1) (providing that private transfer fees would not include fees benefiting a 
“Covered Association.”).   
 100. Id. §13(c)(5)(B)(iv). 
 101. 12 U.S.C §§ 2601-17. 
 102. H.R. 6260. 
 103. See Private Transfer Fees, 76 Fed. Reg. 6702, 6709 (proposed Feb. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1228). 
 104. Private Transfer Fee Covenants, 75 Fed. Reg. 49,932, 49,932 (Aug. 16, 2010). 
 105. See Private Transfer Fees, 76 Fed. Reg. at 6703 (“FHFA received over 4,210 comment letters 
from a broad spectrum of individuals and organizations, including . . . conservation funds and land trusts 
and foundations.”). 
 106. Id. at 6708. 
 107. Also excluded from the prohibition are private transfer fees benefiting homeowners’ 
associations, condominiums, and cooperatives.  See id. at 6707. 
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“used exclusively for the direct benefit of the real property encumbered by the 
private transfer fee covenants.”109  A private transfer fee conveys a “direct benefit” 
under the rule that the benefit of the proceeds flows to the community comprising 
the encumbered properties and their common areas or to adjacent or contiguous 
property.110  Thus a conservation fee is not subject to restriction if its proceeds 
benefit the encumbered property, neighboring properties in the same development, 
or adjacent land.  A conservation organization that allows its funds to be used for 
other purposes, such as acquisition of land or to support general operations, would 
be restricted by the rule. 
The FHFA should be applauded for recognizing the unique nature of a 
conservation transfer fee and exempting it from the prohibition.  The limitation of 
the use of such a transfer fee to direct benefit of the property, however, is 
inappropriate and should be removed.  This limitation fails to recognize the great 
benefit to a property encumbered by a conservation transfer fee, even if the 
proceeds of such fee are not exclusively used for the direct benefit of the property 
encumbered.  Imagine, for example, that the proceeds of a conservation transfer fee 
are used to steward and protect a nature preserve that is a few miles away but still a 
part of the same watershed.  The protection of that watershed certainly benefits the 
property subject to the conservation transfer fee in a substantial way.  Or perhaps 
the proceeds of the conservation transfer fee will be utilized to remove an invasive 
species that is moving into the region but has not yet reached the subject property.  
By requiring the proceeds of a conservation fee to only be used directly on the 
subject property, this rule will impede preventative action by an environmental 
organization that could greatly benefit the subject property in the long run. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Private transfer fees are in their infancy as a real property concept.  
Policymakers and courts will wrestle with their validity and value as they mature.  
While the developer transfer fee has put a bad taste in the mouth of many, it is 
important to recognize that this is just one flavor of private transfer fee.  The 
conservation transfer fee, and perhaps many other iterations of the private transfer 
fee, are valuable tools to create benefit for the property owner and the public.  
Clear cutting the forest to eliminate the diseased developer transfer fee from the 
real estate landscape is an overreaction and will, quite literally, hurt many healthy 
trees. 
 
                                                                                                     
 108. “Excepted transfer fee covenant” means “a covenant to pay a private transfer fee to a covered 
association that is used exclusively for the direct benefit of the real property encumbered by the private 
transfer fee covenants.”  Id. at 6708.  “Covered association” means “an organization described in section 
501(c)(3) . . . of the Internal Revenue Code.”  Id. at 6707.  Land trusts, the beneficiary of a conservation 
transfer fee as defined by this article, are traditionally 501(c)(3) organizations and would thus be 
included as a “covered association.” 
 109. Id. at 6708. 
 110. Id. at 6707. 
       
